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Introduction 
 
ISIS is one of the largest and the most lethal terrorist groups to date. It 
functioned with its so-called Caliphate as a proto-state for over four years.  
At its zenith in 2014, ISIS had managed to take over approximately 40 
percent of Iraq and 60 percent of Syria.1 It also attracted over 40,000 
foreign fighters to its ranks from over 130 countries.2 ISIS terrorized those 
in the territories it overtook, as well as mounted terrorist attacks all over 
the world, in cities as far ranging as: Brussels, Dhaka, Istanbul, Jakarta, 
London, New York, Nice, Orlando, Paris, and Sydney, to name but a few. 
ISIS also spread its brand globally to over 14 affiliates across the Middle 
East, Africa, and Central Asia.3 
 
Moreover, it was one of the richest terrorist groups in history, with its 
financing coming from a number of sources including: Bank theft, ransom 
for hostages, takeover of the oil wells in Syria, and subsequent sale of oil to 
Turkey and Assad’s government. Additionally, it profited from looting, sale 
of antiquities, human trafficking of sex slaves, taxation of its population, 
and takeover of local commerce in the areas under its control. ISIS at one 
point had a daily income of 3 million United States Dollars (USD) with an 
annual revenue of 2.9 billion USD.4  
 
Understanding the inner workings of this group is crucial, but it is only 
possible to glean such information from a number of vantage points: From 
studying its publicly available propaganda and statements, its captured 
internal documentation, and interviewing those who either lived under or 
actually served inside the group. While there is a great deal of readily 
accessible ISIS propaganda to study, internal documentation has only 
recently been collected and captured, but is still not available to all 
researchers. What has been studied of ISIS propaganda provides a rich 
body of literature which can be accessed elsewhere, but is not covered here 
in any detail given the desire to report on what ISIS members themselves 
say in primary interviews.  
 
Primary interviews of those who lived under ISIS are possible for those 
willing to travel into Syria and Iraq where ISIS is unfortunately still active. 
In these danger zones, interviews of victims of ISIS are relatively easy to 
come by, but interviews of ISIS cadres are much more difficult to obtain, 
as most prison interviews reside within the realm of classified intelligence, 
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and research access is often limited to one-off and superficial interviews. 
Defectors’ and returnees’ interviews are possible closer to home, but are 
often hard to locate, access, and may still constitute a threat. All three 
groups of ISIS insiders (prisoners, defectors, and returnees) are often 
reluctant and fearful about giving interviews.  
 
Consequently, there is a dearth of primary source data regarding terrorists 
in general—and ISIS in particular—due to the difficulty of gaining safe 
access to imprisoned, defected, or returned terrorists for purposes of 
interviewing them and, once access is achieved, convincing them to talk. 
The researchers involved in this study worked hard to overcome such 
obstacles with the primary researcher managing to gain access to a 
significantly large and wide range of both male and female, local and 
foreign, younger and older, ISIS cadres ranging from foot soldiers and 
family members, to ISIS emirs and members of the emni—the ISIS 
intelligence arm. The resulting data set has yielded an enormous cache of 
information that sheds new light on how ISIS recruits both locally and 
from afar, the motivations and vulnerabilities with which its recruiters 
create resonance, how travel to ISIS is arranged and occurs, entry into the 
group including training and indoctrination, positive and negative 
experiences inside the group, and changes over time regarding 
commitment to the group and the militant jihadist ideology espoused by 
it— changes often related to disillusionment, defection, return or capture. 
This study reports on 220 in-depth interviews and managed to include 
interviews from ISIS cadres hailing from 35 countries and representing 41 
ethnicities. 
 
Research Method 
 
The research method for this study was to attempt to gain access to any 
member of ISIS, male or female, whether he or she be a defector, returnee 
from the battleground, or imprisoned ISIS cadre. Then, we conducted a 
semi-structured, video-recorded, in-depth psychological interview with 
that ISIS member. The lead researcher worked with prison officials, fixers, 
translators, and research associates who arranged access, recorded video, 
and translated the interviews and in two cases carried out the interview in 
the researcher’s absence (in one case due to the ISIS cadre arriving 
unannounced, and in the second due to the interviewee refusing to talk to 
a woman).5   
Journal of Strategic Security, Vol. 13, No. 1
https://scholarcommons.usf.edu/jss/vol13/iss1/5
DOI: https://doi.org/10.5038/1944-0472.13.1.1791
 84 
 
 
In all cases the semi-structured interview started with a brief history of the 
individual focusing on early childhood and upbringing, covering life 
experiences prior to becoming interested in ISIS. This was done to create a 
baseline with inquiry into basic demographic information, educational 
level, family stressors, and other background information. Questions then 
turned to how the individual learned about the conflicts in Syria, and 
about ISIS, and became interested to travel or join. Questions explored the 
various motivations and vulnerabilities for joining and obtained a detailed 
recruitment history: How the individual interacted with ISIS prior to 
joining, whether recruitment took place in-person or over the Internet, or 
both; how travel was arranged and occurred; ISIS intake procedures and 
experiences with other militant or terrorist groups prior to joining ISIS; 
and training and indoctrination. The interview then turned to the 
interviewee’s experiences in ISIS: Family, living and work experiences 
including fighting history; inquiry about what was good and what was not 
good in ISIS; questions about disillusionment and doubts; traumatic 
experiences; experiences and knowledge about one’s own or others 
attempts to escape; being, or witnessing others, being punished; 
imprisonments; owning slaves; treatment of women, and marriages. The 
interview covered where the individual worked and lived during his or her 
time in ISIS, and changes over time in orientation to the group and its 
ideology, often from highly endorsing it to wanting to leave.   
 
A strict human subjects protocol was followed in which the researchers 
introduced themselves and the project, explained the goals of learning 
about ISIS, and the interview would be video recorded with the additional 
goal of using this video-recorded material of anyone willing to denounce 
the group to later create short counter narratives for the ICSVE Breaking 
the ISIS Brand Counter Narrative Project. This is a project that uses 
insider testimonies denouncing ISIS as un-Islamic, corrupt, and overly 
brutal to disrupt ISIS’s online and face-to-face recruitment and to 
delegitimize the group and its ideology. The subjects were warned not to 
incriminate themselves and to not speak about crimes they had not 
already confessed to the authorities, but rather to speak about what they 
had witnessed inside ISIS. Likewise, subjects were told they could refuse 
to answer any questions, end the interview at any point, and could have 
their faces blurred and names changed on the counter narrative video if 
they agreed to it. 
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These interviews took place in prisons, camps, interrogation rooms, 
offices, and in the field in the countries of Syria, Iraq, Turkey, Belgium, 
Denmark, Kosovo, Kyrgyzstan, Albania, and Kenya. More than half the 
interviews took part in another language and required a translator, 
although the researchers themselves could speak Albanian, Arabic, 
Bosnian, French, Turkish, and Russian, as well as English. All of the 
interviews touched on highly traumatic material and often required 
psychological expertise to support the individual to continue speaking 
about painful events that were difficult to discuss. The interviewer is a 
research psychologist and has been conducting in-depth psychological 
interviews and field research for over 25 years, has interviewed over 700 
terrorists and their family members, and is highly experienced working 
with translators and dealing with traumatic material and in quickly 
gaining rapport in the interview setting. Hence, the interviews generally 
went smoothly, and interviewees opened up and shared a great deal of 
information. Local translators often offered helpful explanations of 
locations and local customs to which the interviewees referred, but 
sometimes their English was limited when translating quickly about highly 
emotional topics. Thus, all of the interviews that were audio or video 
recorded were retranslated by professionals after the fact (in a few cases 
recording was refused) with the professional translators correcting any 
mistakes made in the written records.  
 
In general, the interviews took about an hour and a half. In that time, 
there was a sense of closure in having covered most important topics, but 
in some cases prison and camp authorities rushed the interview, which 
made it difficult to go in-depth on all issues. In others, prison authorities 
allowed the researchers up to five hours to interview; for instance, when 
the author interviewed an ISIS emir in Iraqi prison for five hours about the 
wide range of topics and experiences about which he had detailed 
knowledge. 
 
Sampling 
 
The sample for this study is by necessity a convenience sample, as it is 
extremely difficult to gain safe access to ISIS cadres to interview, and to 
obtain their informed consent for an in-depth interview, thus random 
sampling is not possible. The interviewer did attempt to obtain a 
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representative sample in terms of requesting access to women as well as 
men and attempting to talk to a wide range of nationalities and ethnicities, 
age groups and roles fulfilled within ISIS.  
 
To gain access to defected, returned, and imprisoned ISIS members, the 
main author contacted numerous national authorities, security services, 
police, journalists and others requesting the possibility to interview. Given 
that the author directs the ICSVE Breaking the ISIS Brand Counter 
Narrative Project, a project that creates video clips of ISIS insiders 
denouncing the group that are then used for prevention and intervention 
purposes globally, many national authorities strongly endorsed the project 
and granted access to their prisoner population to help the project expand. 
Police and journalists also at times had access to returnees and defectors 
and helped gain access.  
 
Once access was granted, it was still a challenge to gain permission from 
the ISIS cadres themselves, who were often afraid to speak about their 
experiences for many and varied reasons. Imprisoned ISIS members were 
generally wary of being interviewed, many having had bad experiences 
with journalists who were often less interested in the actual person and 
experiences in the group than looking to promote horrific headlines. When 
the interviewees understood that a sensitive and careful interview was 
sought, that they controlled whether or not it would appear in public, and 
that they could hide their identities, they were more willing to grant 
permission to be interviewed. Nevertheless, many asked that their 
identities be hidden in terms of having their names changed and faces 
blurred in the counternarrative video, or the video never used, and at least 
eight prisoners refused interviews altogether, as did some defectors. In 
some cases, women only wanted to be interviewed by a woman and 
refused to have males present. Two of the male interviewees (both 
Albanian imams) were uncomfortable speaking with a woman, one 
granting the interview only to a male colleague, the other sitting facing 
away from the author and not making eye contact. 
 
Risks for the researchers included the possibility of being attacked during 
the interview or tracked afterward and harmed. Likewise, as many 
prisoner and detainees are held in Syria and Iraq, there is the necessity to 
travel into dangerous areas for those located in conflict zones, meaning 
exposure to possible hostage-taking, bombs, missiles, mortars, and 
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roadside IEDs, as well as attacks inside the prisons or camps themselves in 
which riots occur and ISIS enforcers are active. In prisons and camps, a 
guard usually remained in the room, or just outside it, and in some cases a 
minder was assigned to watch the interview. Dangers existed in the 
prisons, despite having a guard nearby, as the author was well aware, 
having been shown during work in 2006 and 2007 a collection of metal 
shanks created by prisoners in Camps Cropper and Bucca. Likewise, the 
female guards in the camps all told about having been attacked themselves 
inside the camps, and murders and riots among detainees had occurred 
both in the camps and prisons in Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) territory 
during the time period of these interviews. 
 
Defectors interviewed out in the field feared for their safety and wanted to 
be interviewed in highly private settings which increased the dangers for 
the interviewers. ISIS defectors and those released from short stints in 
prison also posed a risk, as some defectors told about being re-contacted 
by ISIS and directed to work for them, or about their own wishes to return 
to ISIS, or reneging on their denunciations and still wanting to be part of 
ISIS.6 One ex-prisoner, for example, ended our time with him by telling us 
that he hoped we would be beheaded in Syria, while another still endorsed 
ISIS, and was later returned to prison for violent behaviors.7  
 
It was never clear if defectors, and those released whom the researchers 
met in the field, had totally disengaged from the terrorist group—or could 
still be acting on its behalf—until the interview got well underway. In one 
case, a Syrian woman being interviewed in Turkey admitted she hated 
Americans and Westerners due to killings of civilians during bombings in 
Raqqa, and that she wished to return to ISIS to die as a martyr on their 
behalf. The researchers were relieved that she had not decided to martyr 
herself that day or lacked the means to do so.8 Likewise, our Turkish 
research colleague learned that ISIS members in Turkey had followed a 
defector to one of our interviews and our colleague was warned by his 
Turkish police colleagues that ISIS might try to kill him as a result. This 
was no idle threat given other ISIS assassinations were carried out in his 
border town of Sanliurfa.9 The researchers took all available precautions 
for their own safety, but budgets did not allow for armed guards, armored 
vehicles, and other security apparatuses. At times these were provided by 
host governments, yet the risks of doing this research were considerable. 
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The sample reported herein, collected over a period of four years and still 
growing, consists of 220 ISIS defectors, returnees, and imprisoned ISIS 
cadres interviewed from September 2015 to September 2019. Thirty-five 
nationalities and 41 ethnicities are represented in the sample. The sample 
consists of 182 males and 38 females. The participants were interviewed in 
a variety of locations: 27 were interviewed in Turkey, three were 
interviewed in Belgium, seven were interviewed in Kosovo (one in prison, 
the rest in home settings), two in a Kyrgyzstan prison, one in an Albanian 
prison, one in a Kenyan prison, 75 in Iraqi prisons, and 104 in detention 
facilities in northeast Syria (prisons and camps) overseen by the SDF and 
Kurdish Asayish, the Kurdish security. Two of the men (1.1%) and three of 
the women (7.9%) never lived in ISIS territory. Some worked as recruiters 
in their home countries, while others were stopped en route to Syria and 
sent back; these were also included in the analysis, as their not having 
lived under ISIS did not preclude them from being active believers in the 
ideology and contributors to the cause. 
 
Demographic Results 
 
Males. The 182 men in the study were from 35 countries and represented 
41 ethnicities. 51.1 percent were foreign members of ISIS, while 34.1 
percent were Iraqi and 14.8 percent were Syrians.  
 
On average, they were 26.00 years old at the time that they joined ISIS 
and were 29.95 years old at the time of the interview. This is a bit older 
than conventional expectations of terrorists ages, perhaps because many 
foreign fighters were motivated in part by lack of employment, 
discrimination, and marginalization among other issues. Male foreign 
fighters were older than their local counterparts, with an average age of 
27.88 at the time they joined ISIS and an average age of 32.58 at the time 
of the interview. While the expectation for terrorists’ ages tends to equal 
the age estimates of criminals in general, factors like discrimination and 
marginalization, as well as subscription to ISIS’s ideology, may prevent 
burnout and motivate older people to become involved or to maintain 
their involvement in the terrorist cause. 
 
Most men in the sample had spent on average 30.4 months inside ISIS. 
This relatively short period, in comparison to other studies of terrorist 
group membership, is due to ISIS’s relatively short lifespan, with only a 
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few joining in its inception (as al-Qaida in Iraq) in 2007 and remaining 
until the siege at Baghouz in 2019. In contrast, most interviewees joined 
after the declaration of the Caliphate in 2014, and either left or were 
captured as ISIS began losing territory in 2017. 
 
Of the men, 81.3 percent were born and raised Sunni Muslim, while 1.6 
percent were born and raised Shia Muslim, later converting to Sunni 
Islam. Of those who were not raised in Islam (n=28), half were born into 
Sunni Muslim families and (n=14) reverted to the religion of their parents, 
and the other half (n=14) converted from atheism, or Christianity.  
 
Prior to joining ISIS, 44.5 percent of the men had never been married, 
46.7 percent were married, and 4.4 percent were divorced. One of the 
drawing points of ISIS for men in countries where unemployment often 
precludes marriage—like Tunisia—or for men finding it difficult to marry 
for other reasons, was the promise of marriage. ISIS even ran a marriage 
bureau in Raqqa to arrange marriages for ISIS members. As a 
consequence, at the time of the interview, only 24.2 percent had remained 
single, 71.4 percent were married, 1.1 percent were divorced, and 0.5 
percent were widowed. Given many women lost their partners in battles 
and bombardments, the low rate of widows in the sample reflects the ISIS 
practice of encouraging swift remarriage. 
 
Socioeconomically, 65.4 percent of the men were from middle-class roots, 
with 18.7 percent and 3.8 percent coming from working- and upper-class 
families, respectively. The men had on average 11.18 years of education 
and represented a variety of occupations prior to joining ISIS: 43.4 percent 
worked in blue collar jobs, 15.4 percent were students, 13.2 percent 
worked in white collar jobs, 6.6 percent were itinerant, 3.8 percent were 
self-employed, 2.2 percent were unemployed and not looking for work, 
and 1.1 percent were unemployed. Among the foreign men, 31.2 percent 
worked in blue collar jobs, 19.4 percent worked in white collar jobs, 15.1 
percent were students, 8.6 percent were itinerant, 4.3 percent were self-
employed, 4.3 percent were unemployed and not looking for work, and 2.2 
percent were unemployed. The higher levels of unemployment and 
underemployment among foreign men indicates that these men had fewer 
opportunities and ties to home, allowing them to leave for Syria and Iraq, 
and were perhaps more susceptible to ISIS’s promises of wealth, social 
inclusion and work. 
Journal of Strategic Security, Vol. 13, No. 1
https://scholarcommons.usf.edu/jss/vol13/iss1/5
DOI: https://doi.org/10.5038/1944-0472.13.1.1791
 90 
 
 
Females. The 38 female participants were from 18 countries and 
represented 22 ethnicities. Of the women, 76.3 percent were foreign 
members of ISIS, while 13.2 percent were Iraqi and 10.5 percent were 
Syrians. They were, on average, 24.32 years old when they joined ISIS and 
27.33 during the interview, having spent 32 months on average inside the 
group. Of the women, 55.3 percent were born and raised Sunni Muslim, 
while 5.3 percent reverted to the religion of their parents. In contrast to 
the low number of male converts represented, 34.2 percent of the women 
in the study (all foreigners, consisting of 10.7 percent of the foreign fighter 
sample) had converted to Islam from atheism or Christianity. 
 
Prior to joining ISIS, 28.9 percent of the women had never been married, 
60.5 percent were married, and 7.9 percent were divorced. At the time of 
the interview, however, only 2.6 percent remained single, with 57.9 
percent married, 7.9 percent divorced, 5.3 percent separated, and 26.3 
percent widowed. This accords with ISIS’s strong policy of requiring 
women to marry or stay locked up inside of dirty, overcrowded, and 
difficult to survive ISIS guesthouses called madhafas. Of the women who 
married during their time in ISIS, regardless of whether they arrived 
married and were widowed or arrived single, 70.0 percent were married 
only once, 20.0 percent married twice while in ISIS, and 10.0 percent 
married three times while in ISIS. 44.7 percent of women were widowed at 
least once while in ISIS and 10.5 percent were divorced.  
 
Socioeconomically, the women paralleled the men in that 63.2 percent 
came from middle-class families, with 21.1 percent and 5.3 percent coming 
from working- and upper-class families. Similar to the men, the women 
had on average 11.59 years of education, but their employment 
represented a slightly narrower scope: 26.3 percent were students, 21.1 
percent worked in blue collar jobs, 18.4 percent were housewives and stay-
at-home mothers, 13.2 percent worked in white collar jobs, 5.3 percent 
were unemployed and not looking for work, and 2.6 percent were 
itinerant.  
 
Table 1. Demographic Results 
Demographic Mean Standard Deviation Range 
Age When Joined 26.00 8.68 10-55 
24.32 7.45 12-44 
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Age When Left 27.86 9.22 10-53 
26.57 8.05 14-48 
Age at Arrest 29.11 9.22 12-57 
26.96 8.29 14-48 
Age at Interview 29.96 9.06 14-58 
27.33 7.56 14-49 
Socioeconomic 
Status 
18.7% Lower Class; 65.4% Middle Class; 3.8% Upper Class 
21.1% Lower Class; 63.2% Middle Class; 5.3% Upper Class 
Length of Time in 
ISIS (Months) 
30.40 24.18 <1-84 
32.00 16.30 <1-60 
Religious Status 81.3% Born Sunni Muslim; 1.6% Born Shia Muslim; 7.7% 
Revert; 7.7% Convert 
55.3% Born Sunni Muslim; 5.3% Revert; 34.2% Convert 
Marital Status 
(Prior) 
44.5% Single; 46.7% Married; 4.4% Divorced 
28.9% Single; 60.5% Married; 7.9% Divorced 
Marital Status 
(Current) 
24.2% Single; 71.4% Married; 1.1% Divorced; 0.5% Widowed 
2.6% Single; 57.9% Married; 7.9% Divorced; 5.3% Separated; 
26.3% Widowed 
Employment 2.2% Unemployed and Not Looking for Work; 1.1% 
Unemployed and Looking for Work; 6.6% Itinerant; 3.8% Self-
Employed; 43.4% Blue Collar; 13.2% White Collar; 15.4% 
Student 
5.3% Unemployed and Not Looking for Work; 18.4% 
Wife/Stay-at-Home Mother; 2.6% Itinerant; 21.1% Blue Collar; 
13.2% White Collar; 26.3% Student 
Education (Years) 11.18 3.73 0-18 
11.59 2.63 5-15 
Legal Status at 
Interview 
1.6% Served Sentence and Released; 1.1% Stay of Sentence with 
Conditional Release; 72.5% Incarcerated Pre-Sentence; 2.2% 
Currently Serving Limited Sentence; 2.2% Currently Serving 
Life Sentence; 5.5% Sentenced to Death; 14.8% Unknown 
2.6% Stay of Sentence with Conditional Release; 76.3% 
Incarcerated Pre-Sentence; 10.5% Currently Serving Limited 
Sentence; 10.5% Unknown 
 
There are scant samples to which the present sample may be compared. 
Thus, there is no way to determine representativeness of the sample. 
However, a noted publication describing foreign terrorist fighters (FTFs) 
in ISIS is the 2017 report by The Soufan Center. The present sample’s 116 
FTFs represent approximately 0.4 percent of the total foreign fighters 
identified by The Soufan Center. Individual countries, however, are 
represented in different proportions.  
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Table 2. Comparison to The Soufan Center Reported Numbers of FTFs 
Country Percent in Sample 
Switzerland 4.3% 
Belgium 2.3% 
Trinidad and Tobago 2.3% 
United States of America 2.3% 
Canada 2.2% 
Kosovo 2.2% 
Germany 2.0% 
Serbia 2.0% 
Australia 1.8% 
The Netherlands 1.8% 
Algeria 1.2% 
Bosnia and Herzegovina 1.2% 
Albania 1.1% 
Sweden 1.0% 
Turkey 0.8% 
Denmark 0.7% 
Indonesia 0.7% 
United Kingdom 0.6% 
Libya 0.5% 
Kazakhstan 0.4% 
Morocco 0.4% 
Pakistan 0.3% 
Russia 0.3% 
Kyrgyzstan 0.2% 
Tunisia 0.2% 
Azerbaijan 0.1% 
France 0.1% 
Saudi Arabia 0.1% 
 
Regionally, the present sample includes 1.7 percent of the FTFs from the 
Balkans, 1.6 percent of the FTFs from North America, 0.9 percent of the 
FTFs from Western Europe, 0.4 percent of the FTFs from South and 
Southeast Asia, 0.2 percent of the FTFs from The Maghreb, 0.1 percent of 
the FTFs from former Soviet Republics, and 0.09 percent of the FTFs from 
the Middle East (excluding Syria and Iraq). 
 
The Soufan Center’s report also includes specific data regarding foreign 
women in the Islamic State. The present sample includes approximately 
8.2 percent of the Belgian women who joined ISIS, 4.2 percent of the 
German women, 2.9 percent of the Canadian women, 2.3 percent of the 
Kosovar women, 1.1 percent of the Dutch women, 0.6 percent of the 
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French women, 0.5 percent of the Kazakh women, and 0.4 percent of the 
Moroccan women.10 
 
Results 
 
The qualitative interview data obtained in these interviews was coded on a 
myriad of variables ranging from psycho-social vulnerabilities to ISIS 
recruitment, to methods of recruitment, travel, experiences inside ISIS, 
disillusionment, and will to fight. Data was coded both for presence and 
level of significance, ranked on a Likert Scale: 0 = “Not Present”; 1 = 
“Present but Not Important”; 2 = “Present and Somewhat Important”; 3 = 
“Present and Very Important”. In some cases, there was missing data due 
to the interview being cut short, the subject having no experience with that 
variable, or a failure to explore it much in the interview due to time 
constraints or the subject being unwilling to discuss. Two members of the 
ICSVE staff created the coding system through numerous iterations, 
beginning with approximately 60 basic variables and ending with 288. The 
second author coded the interviews and discussed with the interviewer any 
variables about which she was not certain. 
 
Psycho-Social Vulnerabilities to ISIS Recruitment 
 
Psycho-social vulnerabilities to ISIS recruitment were coded in terms of 
emotional abuse, physical abuse, sexual abuse, emotional neglect, physical 
neglect, exposure to domestic violence, substance abuse in the household, 
mental illness in the household, parental separation or divorce, having an 
incarcerated household member, having a parent die when the participant 
was a minor, having unmarried parents, having a father with multiple 
wives, family conflict, poverty, leaving home early, personal divorce, 
previous criminality, and unemployment or under-employment. The 
subjects themselves mentioned most of these variables in taking their brief 
family histories. However, the first ten psycho-social vulnerability 
variables are the Adverse Childhood Experiences, life events and 
circumstances that—when occurring in combination with each other—
exponentially increase a child’s risk of mental and physical health 
difficulties in adulthood.11  
 
In this study, psycho-social vulnerability variables are distinct from 
motivation variables. Psycho-social vulnerabilities refer to life experiences 
Journal of Strategic Security, Vol. 13, No. 1
https://scholarcommons.usf.edu/jss/vol13/iss1/5
DOI: https://doi.org/10.5038/1944-0472.13.1.1791
 94 
 
and situations that made the individual susceptible to recruitment or able 
and willing to travel to ISIS. Motivations are the reasons that the 
interviewees gave for why they made the concrete decision to join ISIS. 
There are many variables that are therefore included in both the psycho-
social vulnerabilities and motivations sections of this article but may have 
different results. For instance, unemployment and under-employment 
were coded as vulnerabilities because the people who were unemployed or 
under-employed were not as tightly tied to their home communities and 
may have felt that their home countries had failed to provide them with 
opportunities for meaning and socioeconomic advancement. These same 
people, however, often did not mention employment as a motivation for 
joining ISIS; that is, even though being unemployed made it easier to leave 
home and travel to Syria, they did not do so because ISIS promised them 
employment.  
 
Similarly, drug and alcohol abuse, as a vulnerability, often contributed to 
foreigners’ feelings of jahiliyyah (the Islamic view of sinful ignorance) 
causing them to revert or convert to Islam while still having little in-depth 
knowledge of the religion, making them susceptible to charismatic 
recruiters promising them a new life defined by honor and purity. If the 
foreigners joined ISIS with the expressed intention of getting clean, this 
was coded as a rehabilitation motivation. 
 
Among the men, the most commonly present vulnerabilities were poverty, 
unemployment and underemployment, and a criminal history. When 
rating the vulnerabilities in relation to the participant’s own assessment of 
reasons for joining ISIS, the top three were poverty, unemployment and 
underemployment, and substance use. It should be noted that 
unemployment and under-employment were coded as one variable, 
including not only those without a full-time job, but those who could not 
find permanent work or felt that they could not get jobs consistent with 
their abilities and education level as well. These vulnerabilities turned out, 
not surprisingly, to be contextual and based on the location of the ISIS 
recruit. For instance, the most common vulnerability for male locals was 
poverty, whereas for male Europeans it was personal substance abuse and 
for male non-European foreigners it was previous criminality and 
substance abuse.  
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Many Iraqi youth described being hungry, since for those who lived in 
territory that ISIS controlled, ISIS quickly took over all the trade and made 
it difficult to find a job without working for ISIS. Many of these youth 
joined expecting the ISIS training camp to deliver good meals, pay, and 
other financial benefits. Eighteen-year-old Iraqi Abu Huthaifa for 
example, describes the way that poverty made him vulnerable to ISIS’s 
recruitment efforts, “The videos got me because I was in a poor family and 
I thought joining would help us buy a house, because we were in a rental.”  
 
Unemployment and underemployment represented not only a financial 
challenge for locals, but also a grievance for many participants who felt 
unable to rise in socioeconomic status. Thirty-five-year-old Iraqi Abu 
Hamid al Baghdadi, for instance explains, “A lot of things prevented me 
from getting this job: Corruption, bribes, sectarian shares.” For these 
frustrated Sunni Iraqis and Syrians, suddenly ISIS was offering promising 
employment opportunities. 
 
For male Europeans, the most common vulnerability was personal 
substance abuse. Europeans also cited unemployment and 
underemployment as grievances they attributed as a consequence of being 
Muslim. In many cases, vulnerabilities were multi-factorial. Thirty-eight-
year-old Dutch Munir Hassan al Kharbashi, who is of Moroccan descent, 
recalls his parents divorcing when he was 15, after which “[I] started living 
the criminal life in my youth, smoking and drinking…do what your friends 
do, trying to be with them. Joy riding, stealing cars, making money to 
smoke and enjoy women.” Munir continued with his reckless behavior 
“until I was 23. [Then,] I started focusing on my religion, praying and 
going to mosque. I started having other friends.” He also recalls Dutch 
anti-immigrant politician Gert Wilders being problematic for him in terms 
of promoting discrimination: “I had a beard and long clothes, and my wife 
and I felt discriminated against.” After numerous bouts with the law and 
three failed marriages he decided to go join the ISIS Caliphate. 
 
For male non-Westerners, the most common vulnerabilities were previous 
criminality and substance abuse. For example, 29-year-old Tunisian Abu 
Sara had been drinking excessively during the Tunisian Arab Spring in 
2012. He explains,  
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“I used to sit in my room and drink with some music and so. In 
mosques, I used to see people with long beards saying to me, ‘You 
must stop drinking, this is wrong, you have to pray with us.’ I never 
prayed in my life. After some time, I realized that I was wrong, so I 
quit alcohol. I just go to night clubs and smoke cigarettes. After a 
while, I stopped going to clubs and I wanted to pray to feel good, as 
they claim. I wanted to save my life.” 
 
Among the women, the most commonly present vulnerabilities were 
poverty, family conflict, and prior trauma, with Europeans citing family 
conflict most often and locals citing poverty most often. The most 
meaningful vulnerabilities in relation to the participant’s own explanations 
about joining ISIS were prior trauma, poverty, and family conflict—in that 
order. Describing the impact of her prior traumatic experiences, 46-year-
old Canadian Kimberly Pullman speaks about suffering deep distress 
watching the televised news from the trial of a serial rapist who had 
assaulted her, among many other Canadian women:  
 
“I started failing at university when his trial began, I had a hard 
time focusing, stopped sleeping, [had] nightmares... It was like a 
DVD that wouldn’t shut off; I couldn’t make it stop.”  
 
Falling into a relationship over Twitter with a man already in ISIS, 
Kimberly found solace as he talked to her about restoring honor and that 
she shouldn’t feel suicidal when her services as a nurse were so needed by 
Muslims in Syria. Slowly, he seduced her into marrying him over the 
Internet while she was mired in emotional despair over previous traumatic 
episodes, and he guided her into escaping her problems by coming to 
Syria, ostensibly to help others. 
 
Women from Europe also cite discriminatory practices that made life 
difficult and even hard to hold employment. Thirty-year-old Umm 
Abdallah from Germany says once she converted and began to wear hijab, 
she was told to find another job and then finding that in hijab she could 
not get hired to positions equal to her capabilities. Similarly, 37-year-old 
Lisa Smith from Ireland left the military after converting and being told 
she could not wear hijab to work.12 Twenty-five-year-old Belgian Selene, 
who is of Turkish and Moroccan descent, recalls being afraid that her 
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children would experience discriminatory practices, as she had in Europe, 
saying, “I know people who change their name. They won’t get work.” 
 
Others speak about being spit at or insulted on the streets for wearing 
Muslim attire in public. Some young European female converts were 
thrown out of their family homes after converting, making them 
vulnerable to being taken to Syria by male partners. Others followed their 
husbands and boyfriends, believing that they would be divorced or 
abandoned if they didn’t agree to travel, although many women also 
encouraged their husbands and partners to travel. 
 
Table 3. Vulnerabilities 
Vulnerability Men 
Mentioned 
Women 
Mentioned 
Men 
Average 
Score 
Women 
Average 
Score 
Criminal History 13.7% 5.3% 0.29 0.11 
Prison History 10.4% 0%   
Emotional Abuse 0% 7.9% 0.00 0.22 
Physical Abuse 1.7% 7.9% 0.05 0.25 
Sexual Abuse 0% 2.6% 0.00 0.08 
Emotional Neglect 1.7% 0% 0.05 0.00 
Physical Neglect 0% 0% 0.00 0.00 
Domestic Violence Exposure 1.7% 5.3% 0.04 0.11 
Household Substance Abuse 1.7% 7.9% 0.05 0.22 
Household Mental Illness 2.2% 0% 0.05 0.00 
Parental Separation/Divorce 8.8% 21.0% 0.20 0.42 
Incarcerated Household Member 1.1% 5.2% 0.03 0.14 
Deceased Parent 12.1% 7.9% 0.32 0.19 
Unmarried Parents 1.1% 7.9% 0.01 0.19 
Father Had Multiple Wives 5.0% 0% 0.06 0.00 
Family Conflict 9.3% 23.6% 0.28 0.69 
Personal Substance Abuse 13.2% 5.3% 0.34 0.17 
Poverty 24.2% 26.3% 0.65 0.69 
Left Home Early 2.7% 10.5% 0.06 0.34 
Personal Divorce 3.8% 7.9% 0.07 0.24 
Unemployment/Underemployment 19.2% 2.6% 0.49 0.03 
Prior Trauma 11.6% 23.6% 0.32 0.72 
 
Recruitment Influencers 
 
Understanding ISIS’s recruitment is crucial, given their unprecedented 
efficacy in drawing foreign fighters to their cause and to the battlefields. 
Jihadist terrorist groups have recruited Muslims living in the Western 
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diaspora for decades, most notably during the war following the Soviet 
invasion of Afghanistan and the war in Bosnia, and increasing greatly 
following the terrorist attack of September 11, 2001.13 ISIS can be 
differentiated from other militant Islamist groups by its rising during the 
Internet era, a time when the world, especially for young adults, feels 
smaller and more connected than ever before. ISIS recruits in many ways, 
from face-to-face on the ground recruiting to utilizing friends’ and 
relatives’ networks, as well as through cold-calling online. In the latter, 
recruiters utilize methods of swarming and love-bombing, in which those 
who respond to ISIS recruitment on social media by liking, retweeting, 
sharing or otherwise endorsing ISIS propaganda messages are then 
contacted by ISIS recruiters.14 The recruiters pay them lavish attention 
and try to meet their needs in efforts to seduce them into the group. 
Others attract recruits by drawing them into religious and political 
conversations designed to take them down the ISIS pathway.15 
 
The most frequently mentioned and most meaningful influencers in terms 
of joining for men were friends, face-to-face ISIS recruiters, and passive 
viewing of videos posted mostly on YouTube, Facebook, and Twitter by 
ISIS, other related groups, and also from Syrians suffering Assad’s 
atrocities. Twenty-nine-year-old Belgian Abu Usama al Belgique recalls 
watching videos that convinced him that it was his obligation as a Muslim 
to help the Syrian people, saying,  
 
“[It was all] emotion for me going to Syria. Assad is killing civilians, 
barrel bombs, and airstrikes. Civilians were calling people, crying, 
‘Where are the Muslims in the world? You can help us militarily and 
humanitarian!” 
 
Many European and Balkan respondents recall watching such videos and 
hearing the cries of Syrians pleading with the world, asking, “Muslims, 
Muslims, where are you? Come and help us!” Many felt helpless in the face 
of the world powers remaining passive and felt they must take it into their 
own hands and go and join the fight. 
 
Others were moved by statements made by their own and others’ 
politicians and religious leaders. Thirty-five-year-old Trinidadian Zyad 
Abdul Hamid recalls, “I saw John McCain saying Syrians needed help. I 
was a Muslim and thought it’s binding upon me to help.” Saudi Abu 
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Jazeera credits state-run television programs for motivating him to come. 
“Saudi, Qatari TV channels. This is what pushes us to come here.” 
 
Abu Fatima, a 30-year-old German, describes the influence of a close 
friend on his decision to join ISIS: “We had many discussions. He was 
convincing me. He said we are far from the fronts, no air strikes, just 
come.” Others made friends over the Internet with those who went ahead 
and were encouraged by these new friends to come—many who 
misrepresented the realities on the ground in order to convince their new 
friends to travel and join ISIS. 
 
While the Assad videos portrayed atrocities and victims calling out for 
help, ISIS propaganda videos often depicted the Caliphate as victorious 
and as a good place to live as a devout Muslim. The majority of males and 
females in the sample who spoke to ISIS cadres on the ground or watched 
ISIS propaganda materials expected a far more positive experience than 
what they actually encountered. ISIS portrayed hijrah, what they claimed 
as obligatory Islamic migration to live under shariah law and the 
Caliphate, as a means of gaining personal significance, purpose, belonging, 
living under Islamic ideals, enjoying prosperity, and being protected. They 
left out that the men would be forced to fight for the group whether or not 
they wished to, that women would need to remarry in succession if their 
husbands were killed, that once in there was no leaving, that the 
punishments for non-compliance were brutal, and that the ISIS emni 
could accuse and punish anyone, at any time, for anything. Thus, the 
recruiters portrayed an idealistic Islamic state and those traveling to join 
ISIS specifically for the most part, except those who went specifically to 
fight against Assad’s atrocities, claimed that they went believing in a sort 
of utopian dream which turned out drastically different from the actual 
reality. 
 
Forty-five-year-old Indonesian, Abdullah, recalls the influence of a face-
to-face recruiter upon him: “He had a long beard. He was inviting people 
to Islam,” he said, describing the low-key approach that later turned 
rigidly fundamentalist. “He once told me, ‘You are not Muslim.’ I was 
surprised. I’m good, my father and my mother are Muslims. He said, ‘If 
you don’t pray and don’t fast, you are not Muslim. You are a disbeliever.’” 
Slowly Adbullah was talked into changing his lifestyle and then selling all 
his belongings to follow this recruiter into traveling to Syria to join ISIS.  
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In addition to ISIS’s distinction for the absolute numbers of foreign 
fighters swayed by their propaganda (40,000), ISIS also recruited many 
Western women to their ideology and territory. Female foreign ISIS 
members’ motivations for joining are varied, but it is clear that ISIS used a 
specific recruitment strategy, namely, using women as online recruiters 
and glamorizing the ISIS lifestyle, even developing online magazine 
articles specifically targeting them.16 For women in the present sample, the 
most frequently mentioned and most meaningful influencers were 
spouses, Internet recruiters, and parents. Given that young women, 
particularly in conservative cultures, are often dependent on their spouses 
and parents and vulnerable to following their lead, especially if they have 
young children, and also that women and girls, in general, often make 
moral decisions in reference to relationships, it should be no surprise that 
relationships were primary influencers for females.17 That does not, 
however, negate their personal agency in deciding to join ISIS. Many 
women followed husbands, some fearing emotional or financial 
abandonment, and three in the sample claimed not to even understand 
where they were going, but the majority knew they were joining the 
Islamic State and agreed to it, albeit not making the decision completely 
independently.   
 
Salma, a 22-year-old Belgian woman, remembers how her father said her 
life would improve when she travelled to join ISIS:  
 
“My Dad, he wanted to live the really Islamic life. My Dad came first 
and then he called me. He just said, ‘Life is better here. You can 
wear your whole hijab. We’re not oppressed here.’”18  
 
Twenty-nine-year-old German Umm Bilal describes how her husband 
decided to go to ISIS and convinced her to join him in Syria:  
 
“He called after three weeks. He said there are a lot of people here 
who need drugs, orphans. Many need someone to take care of them. 
It’s a good thing for Allah and gives a high degree for Allah.”  
 
Internet recruiters often were seductive to these women, promising 
marriage, significance in ISIS and traditional lifestyles. Aisha, a 27-year-
old Kenyan woman, describes falling in love with her online recruiter, with 
Speckhard and Ellenberg: ISIS in Their Own Words
Produced by The Berkeley Electronic Press, 2020
 101 
 
whom she believed she would fight and eventually go to Paradise: “He said 
he wanted to get married. We would go to Iraq and marry and fight 
together. And go to Jannah together.” He ultimately began preparing her 
for a suicide mission.19 
 
Table 4. Influences 
Influence Men 
Mentioned 
Women 
Mentioned 
Men 
Average 
Score 
Women 
Average 
Score 
Spouse/Partner Influence 2.2% 55.3% 0.05 1.85 
Parent Influence 3.8% 15.8% 0.11 0.43 
Sibling Influence 6.6% 5.3% 0.20 0.14 
Extended Family Influence 9.9% 5.3% 0.29 0.11 
Friend Influence 35.7% 13.2% 1.03 0.35 
ISIS Recruiter Influence 25.3% 7.9% 0.77 0.24 
Preacher Influence 19.8% 0% 0.57 0.00 
Internet Recruiter Influence 10.5% 18.4% 0.31 0.58 
Passive YouTube Influence 24.7% 13.1% 0.75 0.36 
Passive Facebook Influence 11.6% 7.9% 0.34 0.24 
Passive Twitter Influence 5.5% 7.9% 0.16 0.26 
Passive WhatsApp Influence 1.6% 2.6% 0.04 0.09 
Passive Telegram Influence 1.6% 0% 0.03 0.00 
Passive Other Internet 
Influence 
1.1% 0% 0.03 0.00 
Mainstream Media 
Influence 
19.2% 10.5% 0.54 0.28 
Prison Influence 5.5% 0% 0.15 0.00 
  
Motivations for Joining 
 
Motivations for joining ISIS differed dramatically by location. For foreign 
males who travelled to Syria and Iraq, the most common motivation was a 
helping purpose, meaning they wanted to provide humanitarian and 
defensive militant aid to the Syrian people. For European women, the top 
motivators were Islamic identity and family; non- European women 
simply wanted to pursue an Islamic identity. Men were more focused on 
employment, and the women were more focused on fulfilling basic needs, 
along with personal and familial safety. For both travelers and locals, 
solidification of an Islamic identity and an Islamist ideology focused on 
building a Caliphate were also present, with locals also often referring to 
grievances such as wanting Sunni rights that they believed would be 
delivered by a Sunni Islamist-run government as opposed to the Shia (and 
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Alawite) dominated governance in Syria and Iraq. Job seeking was also 
operational for foreign fighters and spouses who were unemployed or 
under-employed at home.   
 
The helping-purpose mentioned by both men and women came from those 
who were watching Assad’s atrocities while the international community 
stood silent, or spoke against Assad, but did little to stop him. Meanwhile, 
as mentioned earlier, strongly stirring videos were circulating showing 
Assad’s atrocities, and Syrians calling out for foreigners to come to their 
assistance. These motivations, representing higher ideals and aspirations 
to play a role in the greater world, parallel those identified by other 
researchers studying terrorism across time and ideologies.20 
 
Twenty-eight-year old Kosovar Abu Albani witnessed Serbs invading his 
village as a young child. Years later, when his friends started passing 
around self-made videos from Syrians of Assad’s atrocities showing 
butchered corpses, bombed out rubble, even gassed neighborhoods and 
women and children killed en masse, all his childhood terror and distress 
was brought back to the surface. He vividly remembered the American 
“foreign fighters” who had rescued Kosovo and felt that it was now his turn 
to go help—that it was his duty as a Muslim.  
 
ISIS cadres from many parts of the world, but particularly the Balkans, 
who remembered suffering the effects of war themselves, were deeply 
distressed by watching videos of Assad’s atrocities and Muslims calling out 
for outsiders to come help. Those who traveled early during the Syrian 
Civil War to fight Assad, or simply to help in a humanitarian manner, 
seemed to be well-intentioned in the beginning but were later drawn into 
ISIS for various reasons. Abu Albani, for example, wanted to repeat the 
good acts of Americans that had freed Kosovars, but he later fell in with 
ISIS and admitted to participating in some of their gory genocidal acts 
such as those committed against the al Sheitat tribe.21 Many foreign 
fighters spoke about becoming trapped in Syria as the Free Syrian Army 
(FSA) and Ahrar al Sham began hunting foreign fighters and the Turkish 
border was blocked for them. They sought safety in ISIS territory where 
they were welcomed, but also forced to join and become fighters for the 
group. 
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Many men and women described joining due to an underlying longing for 
an Islamic Caliphate to be re-established and having been extremely 
moved by the declaration of the ISIS Caliphate, supported by the fact that 
ISIS had taken control of such significant swathes of land in both Syria 
and Iraq. For instance, 44-year-old Havaz Hamadi Omar recalls,  
 
“I was in Sweden when Baghdadi declared his Caliphate. Since we 
were in our childhood, we are studying in our school that one day 
the Caliphate will come and it will be established, so when we saw it 
in Mosul, we think this day has come, and we have to go and join 
it.”  
 
Some of those who, like Omar, came to live under the Islamic State 
Caliphate claimed they didn’t know they would be pushed into becoming 
fighters. Islam Khenkar Aliev, a 25-year-old Russian, explains how he was 
working to develop himself Islamically: “I didn’t come here for fighting, I 
came for knowledge and shariah, I wanted to be a civilian and live in the 
Islamic State.” While it may have been self-serving denial, many men 
expressed complete surprise at being forced into fighting and claimed they 
came to learn and to live in an Islamic utopia, not to fight. 
 
Tunisians and Europeans also often referred to being hassled at home for 
trying to live a Salafi lifestyle, the former hassled by security services, the 
latter by Islamophobic Europeans. Tunisian Abu Tahir, for instance, 
recalls being hassled by the police and even interrogated, as he explains, 
“If you go often to the mosque, they [the security services] look at you in a 
different way. This affected me.” A Tunisian friend who had gone before 
him told Abu Tahir that if he came to the ISIS Caliphate, he would be able 
to practice his Islamic rituals unhindered.22 
 
Muslim women often are the ones who suffer the most from Islamophobic 
attacks in the West, as their identities are so clearly marked due to their 
Islamic dress. It was not surprising then to learn that women often cite 
suffering from Islamophobia as a reason for wanting to live under what 
they believed would be Islamic ideals. Thirty-seven-year-old Lisa Smith, 
for instance, enjoyed her career in the Irish army until she converted to 
Islam, when she says, “I asked if I could wear headscarf. They said, ‘No.’ I 
knew I had to cover so I got out. If they had said ‘yes’ I may have stayed in 
till now.” She also referred to not wanting to serve in a military that was 
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fighting Muslims. Feeling unable to follow her new faith while in the 
military, alongside a charismatic recruiter telling her it was her duty to 
come live under the newly declared Caliphate was only one of the many 
experiences that Lisa says caused her to believe that she could not fully 
pursue her religion in Ireland, and therefore needed to make hijrah to the 
Islamic State.23 
 
Women moved by the declaration of the ISIS Caliphate and impressed by 
its territorial gains also described believing they had a duty to migrate and 
live in the Caliphate. Thirty-two-year-old Umm Mohamad, who grew up in 
Holland, says that she was swayed to travel to ISIS by exposure to 
mainline news as well as ISIS propaganda: “I believed that every Muslim 
has an obligation to live where they can practice their Islam. Their 
propaganda was very strong. ISIS was strong.” Umm Mohamad points out 
that it was not just ISIS propaganda that was convincing, and that in the 
beginning it was mainstream news that convinced her, as she explains, 
“Western media was also a big hype: They [ISIS] took over half of Iraq in 
three, four days.” 
 
Others tell about their belief in the terrorist claim of having an Islamic 
duty to make hijrah. Beatrice, a 31-year-old woman from Belgium, had 
recently converted to Islam when she learned about hijrah and was told 
that it was her obligation to move to a country ruled by shariah. She 
remembers, “I wanted first go to Malaysia or Indonesia. I don’t know. I 
was confused. Then I read about Syria. I was on Facebook, you know, and I 
spoke with people in these days. And then, I fell to ISIS.”24 
 
Women frequently followed husbands. For instance, 23-year-old Belgian 
Cassandra Bodret, describes her fear of abandonment by her husband:  
 
“He started warning me that if I don’t come, he’s going to divorce 
me, take a second wife—that I cannot accept. He came before me, 
and I was so touched, that he was here alone. Then I followed.”  
 
While foreign women often decided to follow their partners into ISIS, one 
shouldn’t fall into the trap of zombifying women, as many security services 
do when describing them as completely powerless and without agency, as 
though they were completely manipulated and dependent on their male 
partners who decided to travel to and join ISIS. Women who followed their 
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men into ISIS were for the most part also often just as motivated to join, 
encouraging their husbands and agreeing with them about ideology and 
travel, and some were even the main driving force behind travelling. One 
Krgyz grandmother, for example, believed ISIS claims that there would be 
a signing bonus for as many family members as would come. She talked 
half of her extended family into traveling to Syria to join. She was not 
heard from again, and only her young grandson managed to escape. He 
was smuggled home with the message that they had believed lies and were 
doomed inside ISIS.25   
 
Only three of the women interviewed in this sample were actually deceived 
by their husbands and credibly appeared to have had little to no choice in 
traveling or didn’t know to where they were going. All the rest chose to 
travel with their partners into ISIS, or traveled on their own, knowing they 
could have chosen otherwise and remained at home with extended family, 
divorced, or tried to talk their spouses out of joining. Many women 
recount their own strong desire to join the ISIS Caliphate, live under 
shariah and follow a traditional lifestyle. Some were proud that their 
husbands would be employed by ISIS, enjoy free housing and other 
benefits, and be helping to build the Caliphate.  
 
As far as local women, the sample did not include many Syrian and Iraqi 
women (n=9) and those interviewed were all imprisoned in Iraq where 
they faced serious sentencing, except one Syrian woman who was 
interviewed in Turkey. Among the Iraqi locals, three young women tell of 
having been taken from Iraq into Syria by male family members belonging 
to ISIS and claim to have had no choice in the matter. These were also 
later forced to marry in Syria and seem genuinely traumatized by that 
experience, describing their husbands as rapists. The Syrian women 
interviewed, also in Iraqi prison, had been extracted from SDF territory to 
Iraq due to being wives of high-ranking Syrian ISIS members. These 
women claim not to have had integral roles as ISIS members, serving more 
as spouses, and claim to have joined not of their own volition, although 
they may have been hiding their guilt. Thus, it is hard to comment on local 
women’s motivations for joining from this sample. 
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Table 5. Motivations 
Motivation Men 
Mentioned 
Women 
Mentioned 
Men 
Average 
Score 
Women 
Average 
Score 
Basic Needs 18.7% 13.2% 0.49 0.30 
Employment 22.6% 5.3% 0.59 0.11 
Personal/Family Safety 4.4% 13.2% 0.12 0.34 
Family Ties 4.4% 42.1% 0.13 1.11 
Immediate Sexual 
Gratification 
0% 0% 0.00 0.00 
Emotional Relationship 
Escape 
5.5% 0% 0.15 0.00 
Adventure 4.4% 2.6% 0.11 0.08 
Romance 0.5% 15.8% 0.01 0.42 
Masculine Identity 1.7% N/A 0.04 N/A 
Feminine Identity N/A 5.3% N/A 0.11 
Islamic Identity 28.6% 50.0% 0.75 1.42 
Discrimination 7.2% 13.2% 0.20 0.42 
Ideology-Related 
Hassling 
3.3% 2.6% 0.10 0.08 
Ideology-Related Arrest 0.5% 0% 0.02 0.00 
Belonging 6.0% 5.3% 0.15 0.11 
Personal Significance 8.8% 5.3% 0.21 0.17 
Helping Purpose 30.8% 21.0% 0.86 0.56 
Anger Purpose 13.2% 2.6% 0.34 0.06 
Caliphate Ideology 22.5% 13.1% 0.61 0.36 
Jihad Ideology 19.3% 7.9% 0.56 0.19 
Hijra Ideology 9.3% 7.9% 0.26 0.25 
Takfir Ideology 2.2% 2.6% 0.06 0.06 
Anti-Western Ideology 6.6% 0% 0.17 0.00 
Sunni Rights 11.5% 0% 0.32 0.00 
Eternal Rewards 4.4% 5.3% 0.13 0.17 
Eternal Honor 0.5% 0% 0.01 0.00 
Redemption/Forgiveness 1.1% 2.6% 0.03 0.08 
Rehabilitation 5.5% 0% 0.14 0.00 
Fear of Hell 1.6% 5.3% 0.04 0.14 
Tricked 0.5% 2.6%   
 
Roles 
 
Men’s roles in ISIS were far more varied than the women’s roles. The most 
commonly mentioned roles are that of ribat (border patrol) and fighter, 
with 34.6 percent and 35.2 percent of men reporting that they took on 
these roles, respectively. Of the men, 51.6 percent admitted to serving in 
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one or the other, or both, fighting roles during their time in ISIS. Likely 
many more were fighters but did not incriminate themselves by admitting 
it. Other commonly reported jobs were engineers, mechanics, and medical 
personnel. It was common for men to become terrified and disillusioned 
from battleground experiences or injured, and for both reasons they often 
cycled in and out of fighting roles. Those who were injured could get an 
ISIS doctors pass to serve in an administrative post while rehabilitating, 
and some also managed to get reassigned through connections. In both 
cases, those who were able-bodied were pressured back into fighting roles. 
Likewise, many men who became disillusioned with ISIS deserted and 
simply stopped working for the group. The cost of living in Syria was such 
that if they had brought money in with them, or were clever enough to run 
a side business, they could survive with a relatively high quality of life. 
Some of these described going to the riverside restaurants in Tabqa and 
enjoying family life—particularly those who had just married and were 
starting their families. Many of the deserters were arrested at some point, 
sometimes tortured, and forced back into military service. 
 
In contrast, 97.4 percent of the women in this sample claimed to have 
acted as wives and mothers, and the roles of suicide terrorist, face-to-face 
recruiter, and medical personnel were also reported by one woman each. 
Additionally, two women report being members of the hisbah, ISIS’s 
morality police. Men who speak about women’s roles explain that Western 
women in particular were recruited into the ISIS hisbah and to be online 
recruiters based in a house in Raqqa. Likewise, ICSVE collected evidence 
that women in ISIS trained as fighters, learned to handle machine guns, 
grenades, and IEDs. One woman was reported to wear a suicide vest at all 
times. They also trained as spies and carried money and messages.26  
 
Marriage and motherhood were highly encouraged, if not outright 
mandated, for ISIS women. Women who arrived unmarried or who were 
widowed were not allowed to live as single women, and were generally 
forced to live in a women’s guest house, what ISIS referred to as a 
madhafa. Conditions in the madhafas were so bad that single women and 
widows who otherwise would not remarry, frequently agreed to marriage 
simply to escape from them. Twenty-four-year-old Hoda Muthana, among 
others, says she did everything she could to avoid being forced back into a 
madhafa. However, in her case, this meant she had to try to run a small 
business on her own in order to live. She begged others to help her get 
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diapers and supplies for her infant, as ISIS did not allow women to travel 
in a taxi alone. Hoda finally relented and remarried out of desperation.27 
This coercion to remarry resulted in many ISIS women having serial 
marriages, sometimes even marrying before their iddah, the mandatory 
waiting period of four months in order to determine if a pregnancy 
resulted from the previous marriage, was completed between marriages. 
Likewise, many of these women are now arrested and in camps with their 
children from their multiple marriages. The children having different 
fathers and therefore different claims to nationality greatly complicates 
matters of repatriation for ISIS mothers and their children.  
 
Table 6. ISIS Roles 
Role Men Reported Women Reported 
Ribat 34.6% 0% 
Fighter 35.2% 0% 
Suicide Attacker 1.6% 2.6% 
Teacher 1.1% 0% 
Preacher 0% 0% 
Emni 1.6% 0% 
Hisbah 3.8% 5.3% 
Shurta 3.8% 0% 
Wife/Mother N/A 97.4% 
Transporter 4.4% 0% 
Ambulance 2.2% 0% 
Accounting 2.7% 0% 
Intake 2.2% 0% 
Housing 1.6% 0% 
Oil 3.3% 0% 
Emir 3.3% 0% 
Madhafa Oversight 2.7% 0% 
Cook 3.3% 0% 
Spy 2.2% 0% 
Face-to-Face Recruiter 0.5% 2.6% 
Internet Recruiter 2.2% 0% 
Medical 6.0% 2.6% 
Engineer/Mechanic 7.7% 0% 
Other 20.9% 0% 
 
Sources of Disillusionment 
  
In this study, sources of disillusionment are defined as events, behaviors, 
and values that the participant found to be contrary to what had initially 
drawn them to ISIS or caused them to decide to defect from the group. The 
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sources of disillusionment have, in previous research, been described as 
push factors. The impetus to join a terrorist group consists of both push 
(reasons to leave one’s home, such as marginalization or discrimination) 
and pull (reasons to go to the terrorist group, such as the promise of 
dignity and purpose) factors. In contrast, disengagement from terrorist 
groups has been shown to be primarily linked to push factors alone, that 
is, disappointing or even traumatizing experiences in the group, rather 
than new opportunities or political changes at home.28 However, it should 
be noted that many of the respondents kept in close Internet contact with 
their mothers and some expressed deep regret for having caused their 
mothers distress by joining ISIS. Likewise, many male respondents 
referenced avoiding escaping ISIS and returning home when it might have 
still been possible to do so out of certainty that they would face 
prosecution and prison at home.  
 
For men in this sample, the most commonly mentioned sources of 
disillusionment were mistreatment of civilians, lack of food, and 
mistreatment of women, with the most meaningful sources of 
disillusionment being mistreatment of civilians, lack of food, and 
mistreatment of ISIS members, which included imprisoning and torturing 
those who tried to leave. In contrast, the most common sources of 
disillusionment for women were the mistreatment of women, lack of food, 
and the acts of ISIS attacking outside their territory.  
 
Mistreatment of civilians is often defined as hypocrisy on the part of ISIS 
leadership, illustrated by Syrian Ibn Mas, who says,  
 
“They smoked in groups, but in public they looked for anyone 
smoking. Then they didn’t advise him but imposed a penalty on 
him. In the same time, they forgot to hold themselves accountable.”  
 
This mismatch between the ISIS hisbah arresting, fining, and flogging men 
for smoking while the hisbah themselves smoked, as well as the hypocrisy 
of ISIS covering up rapes carried out by their members while brutally 
punishing sex crimes of any type in the general population is often cited in 
the sample. Likewise, men frequently cited mistreatment of women as 
something that disappointed them, but not as something that pushed 
them out of ISIS, although there were a few exceptions in this regard.  
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Nineteen-year-old Syrian Ibn Ahmed worked as a guard at a facility where 
ISIS held 450 sex slaves for serial rape. Once, he witnessed a pregnant 
woman being punished for spitting in the face of an ISIS soldier: “They 
took her out in the corridor and stomped on her and her abdomen. When 
she was done, they had kicked her so badly she was covered in blood [had 
miscarried].”29 Of all the horrors he witnessed, the rape of a 15-year-old 
girl by a Sudanese foreign fighter remains etched in Ibn Ahmed’s psyche: 
“He raped this girl. I swear to God she was hemorrhaging […] she died of 
internal bleeding. Our commander forbade us to talk to anyone about it.” 
When Ibn Ahmed saw that the Sudanese man was pardoned and released 
from ISIS prison after only seven days, he became overwhelmingly 
disgusted and decided to flee the group.  
 
Abu Albani, who remains completely radicalized, admits that ISIS treated 
women especially poorly. He explains that when women got sick, ISIS 
would not permit them “to go to a hospital by themselves […] They 
wouldn’t take them to a hospital. They didn’t take care of them.” He recalls 
a German widow of a Kosovar ISIS fighter: “She is in Syria with four of her 
kids and she is sick from cancer. They are not taking her back to Kosovo so 
she can get cured, or to some other place. Can you imagine? She is left 
alone and sick in Syria.”30 
 
The women who cited attacking outside of ISIS territory as a source of 
disillusionment often speak of sympathizing with women and children 
killed in ISIS attacks in Europe. Those who are from Europe express shock 
and dismay as well as concern for their own family members back home. 
Speaking about the attack at the Zaventem airport in Brussels, 22-year-old 
Belgian Salma says, “Killing people on a battlefield, they have guns 
shooting at you, but killing innocents, it could have been me.”31  
 
Table 7. Sources of Disillusionment 
Source of 
Disillusionment 
Men 
Mentioned 
Women 
Mentioned 
Men Average 
Score 
Women 
Average Score 
Civilian 
Mistreatment 
22.5% 7.9% 0.63 0.25 
Failure to Fight 
Assad 
3.8% 0% 0.10 0.00 
Cooperation with 
Assad 
1.7% 0% 0.05 0.00 
Local Favoritism 11.6% 7.9% 0.31 0.22 
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Foreign Fighter 
Mistreatment 
16.5% 2.6% 0.47 0.08 
Lack of Pay 11.0% 2.6% 0.24 0.06 
Lack of Food 20.9% 34.2% 0.51 0.92 
Attacking Outside 
of ISIS Territory 
5.5% 18.4% 0.13 0.56 
ISIS Member 
Mistreatment 
19.8% 18.4% 0.53 0.50 
Women 
Mistreatment 
19.2% 71.1% 0.39 1.97 
Sunni 
Mistreatment 
6.6% 2.6% 0.20 0.03 
Practice of Takfir 7.7% 2.6% 0.21 0.08 
Corruption/Theft 19.2% 2.6% 0.48 0.06 
Bad Governance 13.7% 2.6% 0.36 0.06 
Deradicalized 6.1% 7.9% 0.14 0.26 
No Longer 
Supported ISIS 
15.9% 7.9% 0.45 0.22 
No Longer 
Believed in 
Caliphate 
7.2% 13.2% 0.19 0.42 
No Longer 
Supported Jihad 
2.2% 2.6% 0.06 0.08 
No Longer 
Supported Takfir 
0% 0% 0.00 0.00 
 
Traumatic Experiences 
 
Traumatic experiences in ISIS were separated into three categories: 
Atrocities and crimes that were committed against or experienced by the 
participant, those witnessed by the participant, and those actively 
committed by the participant. The last of these is something the 
researchers warned subjects not to talk about so as to avoid incriminating 
themselves, but at times they would recount crimes for which they had 
already been prosecuted or spoke openly about crimes they had 
committed, despite the warning. In cases where they spoke about crimes 
for which they had not yet been prosecuted, the subjects were asked to 
move on to other topics so as not to harm themselves and provide evidence 
that might later be used against them. 
 
Of the male participants, 46.2 percent reported experiencing bombings, 
34.1 percent were imprisoned by ISIS, and 12.1 percent experienced 
physical torture. Smaller percentages of the men reported being wounded 
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in battle (8.8%), being wounded in bombings (8.2%), and being flogged 
(5.5%). Of the female participants, 65.8 percent experienced bombings, 
42.1 percent were widowed by ISIS-related violence, and 21.1 percent were 
forced into marriage. Other traumatic experiences included being 
imprisoned by ISIS (15.8%) and rape (7.9%).  
 
All of the subjects described bombing as terrifying, particularly those who 
stayed in Raqqa during heavy bombardments and for those who stayed in 
ISIS until the end, most moved from Raqqa to Mayadeen and then crossed 
over the Euphrates to escape Russian and Syrian bombings which 
eventually followed them. Twenty-seven-year-old Dutch Abu Sarayah 
recalls of Hajin, “Everywhere we went there were lots of bombings. I got 
injured one time, we were living at a friend of mine and the house got 
bombed by Russians and we had to pull [my wife] out of the rubble.” She 
had a broken leg, and the baby was fine. Those who made it to the last days 
of the Caliphate continued to flee bombings as they moved down river, 
ultimately ending in Baghouz. There, many described living in dug-out 
trenches where they tried to stay below ground level to avoid being hit by 
snipers while the entire area was bombarded. Twenty-eight-year-old Saudi 
American Abu Suahib recalls in Baghouz, “The coalition was very brutal in 
its bombings, killing whoever, smashing houses full of women and kids.” 
Forty-six-year-old Australian Abu Imran recounts in nearby Hajin, “In the 
last two months there were a lot of bombs. All the houses around me were 
bombed. I thought, ‘It’s my turn, we are going to die.’” When the U.S. 
coalition became involved, the bombardments, even in Raqqa, became 
much more precise and drones hunted anyone who went outside, killing 
those who appeared to be ISIS members. To avoid being identified and 
killed by the drones, ISIS men began donning burkas but this only resulted 
in women being targeted by drones as well as men.  
 
ISIS’s torture methods came from Iraqi and Syrian security service 
members-turned-ISIS and were particularly gruesome. Abu Jason, a 25-
year-old from Switzerland, remembers being tortured while imprisoned by 
ISIS: “They put me inside a tire, and chained my hands to poles… no 
water… under the sun […] I was perspiring, and they gave me a little food.” 
Other forms of torture recounted by participants included electrocution, 
waterboarding, rape, and sexual assault. Additionally, torture included 
being beaten by rubber hoses and fists, being kicked, being hung from 
poles or the ceiling, being forced to listen to and watch the torture of 
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others, and being held for long hours in horrifically contorted stress 
positions.32  
 
Women who lived in the ISIS madhafas recounted the bad conditions and 
mistreatment endured there, including being unable to leave without 
agreeing to marriage. Twenty-two-year-old Iraqi Sahar’s male ISIS family 
members took her into Syria with them. There, she was raped by the 
husband she was forced to marry. Upon capture, she learned that she was 
pregnant. After the trauma she suffered, Sahar says, “I cannot love this 
baby.” When asked if she would get an abortion, she replies, “He’s a 
victim; I will not allow myself to do something wrong to this victim.” 
Instead, Sahar hopes that the baby will be adopted, but knowing that is 
unlikely, she worries and is unsure whether her family could ever “accept 
my baby or love my baby.” Iraqi women who bore babies under ISIS 
marriages and are now widowed often face the added complication of 
being unable to register them legally. 
 
ISIS women lacked rights in marriage, and many Syrian and Iraqi local 
women were forced to marry ISIS men. European female ISIS members in 
particular cited their shock and dismay over learning that they had to 
endure whatever abuse their husbands meted out to them. Twenty-six-
year-old Belgian Bouchra Abouallal was the second wife to an ISIS 
member who kept her under his violent control. Bouchra claims he 
controlled her phone and posted on her social media: “He threatened 
Belgium with my Facebook account, he ruined my life." Bouchra 
eventually ran away from her husband, knowing that divorce would be 
nearly impossible.33 The difficulty for women to initiate divorces was 
corroborated by Lisa Smith, a 37-year-old Irishwoman, who explains that 
during fights with her husband, he told her, “If you go to the judge [for a 
divorce], I will say you are a kufr [an unbeliever and therefore a spy].” The 
punishment for spying was death, so Lisa stayed with her emotionally and 
physically abusive husband until he was killed in Hajin.34  
 
The men also report witnessing many atrocities during their time in ISIS, 
including executions (23.1%), executed corpses (17.0%), hearing about the 
killing of a family member (15.9%), and torture (15.4%). The crimes 
witnessed by women were most commonly hearing about the killing of a 
family member, usually their spouse having been killed in battle or by a 
bomb attack, (55.3%), seeing executed corpses (10.5%), witnessing torture 
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(5.3%), and seeing a family member being killed, often by bombings 
(5.3%). 
 
The executions described by the participants were no less gory than those 
posted by ISIS that shocked viewers all over the world. Abu Hamza, a 25-
year-old Syrian, paints a terrifying picture of the incident that haunts him: 
“They put his head on the block […] he moved so the [executioner] could 
not kill him, so someone pulled his hair. He moved again so the axe came 
to his head and broke his skull. He was suffering so badly. He didn’t die 
immediately.” Similarly, describing the moment at which she became 
widowed, 15-year-old Iraqi Dina recalls, “My husband resisted ... They 
killed him in front of me.” 
 
Youth particularly spoke of being coerced into suicide missions and being 
forced to execute others, usually in beheadings. One Iraqi described being 
called to a scene of five Peshmerga soldiers dressed in orange jumpsuits 
arranged in a row on their knees. He was handed a knife and instructed to 
behead them while ISIS cadres filmed it. Knowing he would be killed if he 
refused, the youth carried out the beheadings. 
 
Most of the subjects describe living under extreme fear, some from their 
first entry into ISIS, others developing this sense of terror as they realized 
that ISIS was a totalitarian state; the ISIS emni could accuse anyone of 
being a spy or other crimes and public executions and torture were normal 
occurrences. As a result, most did not have many friends and did not talk 
openly, sometimes not even sharing their doubts and fears within their 
families. Subjects told how ISIS trained youth to spy, even on family 
members, and how people informed on one another to the ISIS emni.   
 
Due to our warnings not to self-incriminate as well our human subjects’ 
desire not to potentially cause harm, few men admitted to us about 
committing crimes while in ISIS, with 6.0 percent reporting that they had 
killed on the battlefield, 2.7 percent reporting beheading someone, 1.6 
percent reporting performing non-beheading executions, and 1.1 percent 
reporting performing physical torture. One man also admitted owning a 
slave. The crimes of beating, flogging, and biting were all reported by one 
woman, who served in the ISIS hisbah.35 
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Killing on the battlefield was an act laden with emotion for many of the 
participants. While for many the battlefield provided an appropriate and 
moral setting for killing, some regretfully remembered killing innocents in 
battle, such as that with the Sunni al-Sheitaat tribe, as 20-year- old Syrian 
Abu Musab, who, upon returning from killing fellow Sunni countrymen, 
was rejected by his own mother for having done so: “People hated us 
because we had killed the al-Sheitaat tribe.” Twenty-one-year-old Syrian 
Umm Rashid had survived so many traumas, from losing her first husband 
who served al Nusrah, to having her parents die in regime bombings, that 
once she married into ISIS, she fell completely under their ideology and 
empowered by them. She admitted that as part of the ISIS hisbah, she not 
only flogged and beat other women, “I also used to bite. It is like an 
artificial tool. Put in the mouth, we can bite any part of the body, her back, 
shoulders, breasts, from places you can’t see from the outside and where 
there is ample meat.” When asked if she was horrified by having done so, 
Umm Rashid says, no, that she felt the opposite—that brutally enforcing 
ISIS rules banished her fears and appeared to her as the right thing to 
do.36 
 
Finally, 12.8 percent of the men and 2.7 percent of the women were invited 
to become suicide bombers. While a few in this sample had agreed, they 
escaped or were arrested before carrying out their missions. Likewise, 3.3 
percent of the men and none of the women admitted that they had been 
invited by the ISIS emni to attack their home countries, but many more 
knew of others who had been invited to attack at home.  
 
Table 8. Traumatic Experiences 
Traumatic Event Men Reported Women Reported 
Flogging Victim 5.5% 0% 
Physical Torture Victim 12.1% 5.3% 
Electrocution Victim 1.6% 0% 
Biting Victim 0% 0% 
Psychological Torture 
Victim 
5.5% 5.3% 
Rape Victim 0% 7.9% 
Forced Marriage Victim 0% 21.1% 
Forced to Fight 1.6% 0% 
Experienced Bombing 46.2% 65.8% 
Wounded in Battle 8.8% 0% 
Wounded in Bombing 8.2% 5.3% 
Starvation 3.8% 5.3% 
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Imprisoned by ISIS 34.1% 15.8% 
Imprisoned by Another 
Terrorist Group 
0.5% 0% 
Widowed by ISIS-Related 
Violence 
1.1% 42.1% 
Execution Witness 23.1% 7.9% 
Stoning Witness 3.3% 2.6% 
Executed Corpse Witness 17.0% 10.5% 
Rape Witness 2.2% 0% 
Torture Witness 15.4% 5.3% 
Battlefield Deaths Witness 9.9% 0% 
Family Killed Witness 1.6% 5.3% 
Friend Killed Witness 1.6% 0% 
Death of Family 15.9% 42.1% 
Killed Others on Battlefield 6.0% 0% 
Performed Non-Beheading 
Execution 
1.6% 0% 
Performed Beheading 2.7% 0% 
Performed Beating 1.1% 2.6% 
Performed Flogging 0% 2.6% 
Performed Biting 0% 2.6% 
Owned a Slave 0.5% 0% 
Invited to Attack Home 
Country 
3.8% 0% 
Invited to Suicide Attack 12.6% 2.6% 
 
The Will to Fight 
 
The will to fight describes the motivation cited by ISIS fighters for why 
they fought and continued to go to battle for ISIS, oftentimes even after 
they were disillusioned. Commonly noted wills to fight were fighting the 
regime of Bashar al-Assad (9.9%), being a true believer in the ISIS 
Caliphate and ideology (13.2%), and fear of the brutal punishments meted 
out by ISIS if they refused to fight (12.6%). 
 
Describing his motivation to fight Assad’s army, 32-year-old Mauritanian 
Abu Omar says, “I wanted to fight the regime. In the news, even America 
was saying Bashar [al-Assad] is attacking his own people; doing crimes 
against his own people.” In contrast, 23-year-old Dutch Marwan Rashid 
explains the difficult choice he made to continue fighting, even though he 
no longer believed in ISIS’s cause: “In [ISIS] you cannot say ‘no’ for ribat 
or for fighting, either you go to ribat or go to prison, so for most of us 
foreign fighters it was between prison and fighting.” 
Speckhard and Ellenberg: ISIS in Their Own Words
Produced by The Berkeley Electronic Press, 2020
 117 
 
 
Table 9. The Will to Fight 
Will to Fight Men Mentioned 
Claims Never Did 29.1% 
Fighting Assad 9.9% 
True Believer 13.2% 
Afraid of ISIS Consequences 12.6% 
Employment 7.7% 
Afraid of Outside Consequences 7.1% 
Afraid of Both ISIS and Outside 
Consequences 
3.3% 
Sunni Rights 2.2% 
Believed Would Go to Jannah 2.2% 
Fighting Iraqi Government/Army 1.1% 
Gun Excitement 1.1% 
Forced 1.1% 
Chosen by Family to Fight 0.5% 
Loyalty 0.5% 
Family Ties 0.5% 
Told Fighting Was His Obligation 0.5% 
Takfir Ideology 0.5% 
Cleanse Self of Sins 0.5% 
Fear of Hell 0.5% 
Given Choice Between Fighting and 
Suicide 
0.5% 
Basic Needs 0.5% 
 
Radicalization Level 
 
Because the interviews followed a largely chronological scheme, the 
participants’ level of self-reported radicalization could be gleaned 
retrospectively at two timepoints, as well as the current timepoint. 
Therefore, the three timepoints recorded are: Prior to joining ISIS, at the 
participants’ peak level of involvement, and currently, at the time of the 
interview. The level of radicalization was defined as an ideological 
commitment to ISIS and militant jihad in general, determined based on 
statements indicating that the participant was not at all radicalized (coded 
as 0), somewhat radicalized (1), very radicalized (2), and fully radicalized 
(3). In the coding scheme, fully radicalized people were those who still 
considered themselves committed members of ISIS. In contrast, people 
rated as very radicalized were those who still believed in the violent 
jihadist ideology but had become disillusioned regarding ISIS, and did not 
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believe that ISIS was the group to achieve those goals. For men, the 
average radicalization level at the prior, peak, and present timepoints were 
2.26, 2.39, and 1.29. For women, the average radicalization level at those 
three timepoints were 2.07, 2.38, and 0.87. These scores indicate that, for 
both men and women, ISIS’s initial ideological indoctrination and the 
experiences of living in the Caliphate increased ideological commitment. 
However, over time—with the fall of the Caliphate—having either escaped, 
defected, arrested, or disillusioned over negative experiences, both men 
and women significantly deradicalized. This is an important point as many 
argue for deradicalization schemes with ISIS prisoners. However, this data 
demonstrates some level of “spontaneous deradicalization” happening in 
many cases without any formal programming in place. This spontaneous 
deradicalization occurs based on ISIS’s own failures. One deradicalized 
ISIS female respondent explained this phenomenon the most succinctly 
saying, “I didn’t need any deradicalization program. ISIS itself was the 
best deradicalization program ever.” 
 
Abu Sara, a 29-year-old Tunisian, provides an example of a participant 
whose radicalization level declined over time: “Yes, I believe the Islamic 
[State] is not Islamic but a terrorist organization; maybe in the beginning I 
didn’t think so but after I work with them, there were changes.” Some, 
however, remained steadfastly radicalized, as in the case of Younes, a 27-
year-old Belgian returnee from Syria who showed a journalist an ISIS flag 
hanging in his bedroom, says: “I didn’t change my beliefs; I still believe 
living under Islamic law [is] better to live under than in a democracy.”37 
 
Proclamations of Innocence 
 
Articles detailing the risks and benefits to “talking to terrorists” have 
mentioned the tendency for terrorists to claim that they had no idea that 
the group was committing such horrific attacks, and that they simply 
joined for humanitarian purposes, as many of the participants in this 
study also claimed.38 While none of the participants denied knowledge of 
ISIS’s atrocities at the time of the interview, many denied participating. 
Just over forty percent of the men and 31.6 percent of the women in this 
study claimed that ISIS had cheated, lied, manipulated, or otherwise 
tricked them into joining. This is an important point to consider in that 
many felt bad that they had joined ISIS, and were sorry for what they had 
taken part in, but they generally blamed ISIS, rather than taking full 
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responsibility for their own actions in supporting a virulent terrorist 
group.  
 
While many considered themselves victims in the sense of having been lied 
to, this excuse may only be feasible for those who joined ISIS prior to the 
capture of Mosul and the establishment of the Caliphate in 2014. At that 
time, the mainstream media rarely featured news regarding atrocities 
carried out by the organization. Of the participants who joined ISIS in 
2014 or later, when the group’s true nature had largely been exposed in the 
mainstream media and through its own social media posts, 68.0 percent of 
the men and 40.0 percent of the women said that they felt lied to by ISIS.  
Those who didn’t feel lied to may have believed a self-serving lie, or it may 
be those who joined ISIS had narrowed their focus to listening only to ISIS 
propagandists who did lie and tried to portray the Caliphate positively. 
Likewise, ISIS recruiters often told their recruits not to listen to 
mainstream news as it was lying about ISIS as part of a larger 
Islamophobic goal to tarnish the name of Islam. Thirty-two-year-old Umm 
Mohamed, a Dutch woman of Moroccan descent, says that she learned 
early on not to trust what she saw on the news in Holland: “I don’t believe 
the media, as a Moroccan Muslim. The Western media lies about Muslims; 
they said the Taliban throws acid on women.” She also credited the media 
hype about ISIS for convincing her that they were the true Caliphate and it 
was only once she experienced the horrors of ISIS that she realized, “what 
was said [against ISIS] in the media was true.” 
 
Discussion 
 
The results of this study provide an extensive description of a small but 
diverse sample of ISIS members providing insights on many key variables. 
Though the sample cannot be called representative, it consists of ISIS 
members ranging from minors to older adults, men and women, Muslims 
by birth and converts, from all over the world. The results, particularly 
when analyzed in detail on each of the variables, give decision-makers 
valuable information regarding the characteristics, motivations, 
influencers, recruitment, and travel patterns of those who joined ISIS. 
Likewise, the experiences of ISIS members once inside the group, 
including their ideological and weapons training, their experiences with 
ISIS, changes in their will to fight and their commitment to the group, and 
disillusionment or sustained support are important to understand. While 
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the sample is not necessarily representative, it is large and diverse enough 
to provide strong insights into these issues. 
 
Likewise, policymakers in many countries are currently facing repatriation 
issues and need to better understand how dangerous ISIS returnees may 
be. This study found that the ideological indoctrination of ISIS—and 
perhaps the act of moving to the Caliphate—at first increased commitment 
to the group, but over time many ISIS members became disillusioned and 
less committed to ISIS. As the Caliphate lost its territory and members 
suffered bombardments, deaths of loved ones, battlefield losses, and 
ultimately arrest, many began to spontaneously deradicalize without any 
programming involved. Many in this sample gave strong testimonies 
against ISIS, and agreed to appear in a counter narrative video denouncing 
the group—sometimes asking that their identities be withheld for their 
own protection. Others remained highly committed to the group and we 
were also told about ISIS enforcers still operating in the prisons and 
waiting for the resurgence of ISIS. Clearly, there is a continuum of 
radicalization among those who were in ISIS and careful evaluations will 
be necessary to decide on dangerousness and to program appropriately. It 
is noteworthy that of the 1,000 European male foreign fighters currently 
being held by the SDF, most of whom will likely be repatriated at some 
point, this research interviewed 8.2 percent of them. Thus, this article 
provides a small but highly relevant window into what the international 
community may be facing with this population, showing that it is possible 
to interview and learn from them in hopes of better preparing for their 
return.   
 
In 2016, the International Centre for Counter-Terrorism – The Hague 
(ICCT) published a report on FTFs in ISIS. The report mentions that many 
FTFs joined Jabhat al-Nusra. The present sample includes foreign 
members of ISIS who did not travel to Iraq or Syria. However, of the 122 
foreign-born men and women, 117, including 91 men and 26 women, 
actually lived in ISIS territory and can therefore be referred to as FTFs. In 
the present sample, 7.7 percent of FTFs reported having been members of 
Jabhat al-Nusra before joining ISIS. The ICCT report also details the 
considerations regarding returning FTFs, noting that “30 percent of 
[foreign fighters] who have left from the European Union are now thought 
to have returned.” Indeed, of the ISIS members in the present sample who 
travelled to Syria or Iraq, 7.7 percent were interviewed in their home 
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countries rather than in Iraqi or Syrian detention facilities. The report also 
states that returning FTFs may be “disillusioned with terrorist practices,” 
while others “return to their countries of origin with the intent and 
capability to carry out terrorist attacks.” Of the nine ISIS members this 
study interviewed in their home countries, one was deemed to be no 
longer radicalized, one as somewhat radicalized, three as very radicalized, 
and two as fully radicalized, with one person’s present radicalization level 
unable to be determined, supporting the suggestion that FTFs may return 
for a variety of reasons and with varying levels of radicalization. Likewise, 
this research found evidence of those who defected, but then later wanted 
to return to the group, making note that it is not always a one-way 
trajectory out of terrorism.39 
 
Therefore, a primary concern relating to returning FTFs is the provision of 
deradicalization and programs while they are disengaged from the 
terrorist group, and the prevention of further radicalization in prison and 
reintegration programs upon their release. The present study supports 
concern about prison radicalization. Of the foreign-born ISIS members in 
the sample, 3.4 percent cited experiences in prison prior to joining ISIS as 
an influence in their decision to join, with half of that group saying that 
prison was a strong influence. Of all those interviewed, only two (1.7%) 
reported taking part in a deradicalization program. Therefore, 
participation in such a program could not be determined to be predictive 
of the participant’s current radicalization level. Though, as noted earlier, 
the subjects themselves reflected on disillusionment and spontaneous 
deradicalization occurring as a result of bad experiences inside ISIS, as 
well as seeing the defeat of ISIS and their having been imprisoned. One 
particularly concerning case was Abu Albani, who became even more 
radicalized and committed to ISIS during his prison term following 
conviction in Kosovo for serving in ISIS. After he emerged from prison, he 
was interviewed once again by the researchers, in which he told how he 
had studied the texts of Maqdisi in Albanian while incarcerated and 
become even more committed to the aims of ISIS.40   
 
A striking issue in this study was how many foreign fighters came to ISIS 
out of a desire to help beleaguered Syrians, underlining how important 
foreign policy is and how interconnected the world has become. Young 
men in particular were moved into action when they saw governments 
failing to respond to the thwarted Syrian Arab Spring. Likewise, it is 
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striking to see how strongly videos and Internet propaganda and 
recruiting were in influencing foreign fighters and even locals to join ISIS. 
Notably, 8.2 percent of the sample said they were recruited into ISIS solely 
over the Internet, something that many researchers for years have denied 
as a possibility. Evidently, today’s social media and the intimacy of chat 
and video interactions makes it feasible for terrorist recruitment to occur 
solely over the Internet—something policy makers in every country from 
which ISIS fighters came must consider in terms of ISIS continuing to 
recruit, now less for travel, and more for homegrown attacks.    
 
Likewise, many travelers into ISIS referenced mainstream news as an 
influencing factor—that the many gains made by ISIS touted on the 
regular news made an impression in favor of ISIS for them. Similarly, 
some subjects referred to ISIS recruiters warning them not to believe 
mainstream news and to refer only to ISIS for information. Some 
Europeans stated that they found mainstream news Islamophobic and 
therefore ignored warnings about ISIS, chalking it up to Islamophobic 
Western reporting. These indicators demonstrate how important it is that 
mainstream media does not inadvertently glorify or spread terrorist 
messages. Moreover, counter messaging efforts must take into account 
how those listening to groups like ISIS may have narrowed their focus and 
only listen to ISIS insiders rather than others for any assessment of the 
group. Thus the importance of using actual ISIS insiders denouncing ISIS 
such as those featured in the ICSVE Breaking the ISIS Brand Counter 
Narrative videos. 
 
It is also striking how naïve many Muslim recruits were in regard to their 
hope that ISIS would be able to deliver a promised utopia. For foreigners, 
the dream of becoming significant, having purpose, and a positive Islamic 
identity were strong drivers to ignore the warning signs about joining ISIS. 
Likewise, the ISIS provision of free housing and what appeared to be a 
high-quality life appealed to many. Local Syrians and Iraqis were often so 
hungry, literally and figuratively, for justice and dignity that they joined. 
In all cases, the joiners were yearning for an Islamic dream of dignity, 
justice, purpose, prosperity, and Islamic living. This underlines the fact 
that when individuals cannot find these things in their own lives they may 
turn to their religion and become more willing to ascribe to a manipulated 
dream than they might otherwise ignore. This points to the need to 
address local push factors and also delegitimize groups like ISIS in ways 
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like the authors do in the Breaking the ISIS Brand Counter Narrative 
Project by creating counter narrative testimonies of insiders that tell the 
truth about how un-Islamic, corrupt, and brutal ISIS really is.41 
 
In addition to results specific to ISIS members, the ICCT report cited 
earlier also delves into the “nexus between FTFs and crime.” The report 
states that, depending on the sample, between 20 and 50 percent of 
jihadist terrorists have a criminal past. Of the total sample of FTFs in the 
present study, 17.9 percent had a criminal history, with 22.1 percent of 
European FTFs reporting a criminal history, again showing a strong 
interaction between terrorism and prior criminal behavior. Finally, the 
ICCT report further describes the role of women and children as FTFs. The 
ICCT report first notes that approximately 17 percent of European foreign 
fighters are women. In this sample, European women are more heavily 
represented (28.6%). Among the entire sample, 17.3 percent of the 
participants were women.42  
 
Likewise, 67.7 percent of the participants reported having children that 
they either brought with them to Syria or Iraq or that were born during 
their time in ISIS, and 11.8 percent of the participants interviewed for this 
project were minors themselves when they joined ISIS, with 5.9 percent 
under the age of 18 at the time of the interview. The issue of minors 
joining ISIS is a troubling one, particularly for those whose citizenship has 
been stripped, as in the famous case of UK ISIS member Shamima Begum 
(who has spoken with the main researcher but not yet given a full 
interview).43 Minors should be treated with some deference for their 
immaturity by the law, particularly for those who traveled to ISIS as 
minors. However, in the case of ISIS it is also true that the group trained 
even young teenagers to be killers. Particularly poignant are the cases of 
young Iraqi and Syrian boys who went to training camps in hopes of being 
fed, stayed only a short time, and are now facing long sentences for having 
briefly served in ISIS. Similar to these are the tragedies of young local girls 
forcibly married into ISIS and now incarcerated as ISIS members. 
 
Although the present sample represents a small contingent of ISIS 
fighters, particularly FTFs, it is relatively large compared to previous 
studies involving interview data on FTFs. That the results of this study are 
similar to those with smaller sample sizes provides evidence that “talking 
to terrorists” is a research method with strong convergent validity. Dawson 
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and Amarasingam’s 2016 article on 20 FTFs in Syria included jihadists not 
associated with ISIS but nevertheless produced similar results. Just as the 
FTFs in the present sample focused more on the sense of identity and the 
“helping purpose,” while Iraqi and Syrian participants spoke more of 
economic motivations, the FTFs in Dawson and Amarasingam’s sample 
“provided justifications […] that were largely moral and religious in 
character,” rather than economic, similar to this sample which found a 
helping purpose often cited as a motivation for travel to Syria. The fighters 
in their sample also reported having been influenced by both Internet 
sources, specifically the speeches of Anwar al-Awlaki, and by close circles 
of friends, both of which were among the most meaningful influences for 
the male participants in this study.44 
 
The results of this study demonstrate the utility and validity of qualitative 
interview-based research with terrorists. From the stories of the 
participants’ experiences in ISIS, it is clear that most FTFs living far from 
ISIS territory are motivated more so by a desire to bolster their Islamic 
identities which are often under attack by Islamophobic sectors of society, 
as well as the desire to help the greater Muslim community, versus being 
motivated for economic purposes. They are also responding to push 
factors at home including marginalization and discrimination. In contrast, 
these existential motivations are less important for those living in conflict, 
who felt pressure to join ISIS in order to secure food and some semblance 
of safety for themselves and their families. Thus, the risk of former ISIS 
members rejoining the group if they are released or escape from SDF 
detention in particular (as it is in a fragile state), even if they have been 
disillusioned with much of ISIS’s ideology and methodology, should be a 
concern for military and intelligence personnel the world over. Moreover, 
the threat of FTFs returning to their home countries should be countered 
through deradicalization programs that address the vulnerabilities, 
influences, and motivations that drove them toward ISIS, as well as the 
traumas that they experienced while living under ISIS. Likewise, once 
rehabilitated these returnees will also need top-notch reintegration 
programs that help them to address the originally motivating forces that 
drove them into embracing terrorist ideologies in the first place. 
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